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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on historical research, focusing mainly on early-modern Europe, it is assumed that taxation 
functions as a booster of state capacity and Quality of Government (QoG). The presence of this 
relationship for modern-day developing states is however heavily contested. This paper analyzes the 
relationship in a sub-Saharan context. By using new taxation data, which disaggregates resource 
income from other types of taxation (drawn from African Economic Outlook [2010]) we can with 
greater specificity dissect the different effects of different types of taxation. Through a multivariate 
regression analysis the paper shows that taxation, and in particular direct and indirect taxation, as a 
share of GDP seems to be associated with higher levels of QoG, although this relationship is at 
times weak. Furthermore, the relative dependence on direct and, to an extent indirect, taxation, 
measured as its share of the total tax base is shown to be more consistently coupled with better 
QoG. Thus, the paper concludes, more research on the importance of both size and shape of the 
tax base is warranted and needed. 
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Introduction 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????? ?? ???????????????
Supreme Court judge who served during the first decades of the last century. While this certainly 
makes sense, finding such a quotation praising the phenomenon of taxation is not the simplest of 
tasks;; not that there is a shortage of taxation-related sayings and bon mots, but the line above 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????it as oppressive, diabolical or just tedious. This, of 
course, has its natural reasons, both ideological and emotional. Still, whatever one thinks about 
this practice, the fact of the matter is that taxation has been a key element in our history, both as 
a driver of development, and a cause for conflict. Such ideas have been widely employed at least 
as partial explanations in accoun?????????????????????????? ?????????????-modern Europe, while 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????
applicability of the ideas regarding taxation in early-modern Europe in a modern-day 
developmental setting. 
 
This inquiry will focus on the effects of taxation on Good Governance, or Quality of 
Government (QoG), and more precisely how different types of taxation might matter differently. 
The underlying assumption is twofold: a larger tax base will not only strengthen the state, but 
also make it more in touch with its citizenry;; furthermore, taxes derived from a broad base, 
through direct (e.g. income taxes) and indirect (e.g. VAT) taxation is more technically demanding, 
and also more visible, forcing the state to extend both its administrative and its physical reach 
into all corners of its social and geographical territory, thus bolstering administrative capacity and 
legitimacy with regards to the citizenry. Thus, in terms of governance, who gets taxed and how 
revenue is collected may well be just as important as how much money a state can gather. In brief, 
the shape of taxation might matter as much as the size.  
 
Through quantitative analysis, this paper will show that there is much that points to the fact that 
the bulk of the mechanisms present in the Europe-focused, historical research also applies to 
modern-day sub-Sa??????????????????????????????), the empirical basis of this paper. Size but also 
to a, perhaps surprisingly, large degree, shape of taxation revenue appears to matter greatly for the 
quality of African government. 	  
Taxation and Governance: Outlining the Basic Mechanisms 
Prominent economists, such as Nobel-laureate Gary Becker, and policy pundits (Mitchell 2009) 
have argued against high levels of taxation, and big government in general (cf. Persson and 
Rothstein 2010:2). This was a central part of the so-??????? ? ????????????????????? ??? ????????
and early 90s. Lately, however, an increasing body of research and policy advice argues for the 
contrary, that big government and higher government revenue is good for state development, 
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findings and recommendations particularly directed at the developing world (NEPAD-OECD 
2009). Taxation, it is argued, has several positive external effects beside the revenue itself. In the 
field of development economics, taxation reform, mainly the transition from trade taxes to 
consumption- and income taxes, has been a hot topic for many years (cf. OECDa 2008, 
NEPAD-OECD 2009, World Bank Group 2008, Di John 2009), and the link between ?taxation 
and representation? is a central tenet in the discourse on democratization (cf. Ross 2004). For the 
developing world, however, much of the governance- and democracy-related research on 
government revenue has been put in largely negative terms, through the focus ??????? ????????-
state-?????????????????natural resources (and foreign aid) are assumed to be a source of revenue 
which is detrimental for state capacity and popular representation.  
 
Lieberman (2003, see also Mkandawire 2010) identifies three aspects of taxation with special 
relevance to the social sciences: state capacity, collective action, and distributive justice, of which this 
paper mainly will focus on the first two.1  
 
State capacity is the perhaps most direct aspect, as it deals with how a government uses revenue in 
order to build a potent and efficient state apparatus. Prichard and Leonard (2010:655-66) survey 
existing findings regarding the effects of taxation on state capacity, and locates four, quite direct 
and hands-on, areas of improvement: administrative innovations;; pressure for improvements in related 
agencies;; enhanced government presence in remote areas;; and improved gathering of data and information. 
 
From a larger perspective, an efficient state is a state capable of developing a hegemonic and 
?thick? social contract vertically with its citizens by upholding	  order and providing public goods. 
Tilly (2007:16) frames his definition of state capacity as  
 
the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, 
and interpersonal connections alter existing distribution of those resources, activities, and 
interpersonal connections as well as relationships among those distributions.  
 
Such a holistic and citizen-focused definition helps us link state capacity to ??????????? second 
aspect of taxation, collective action, which can be interpreted as a corresponding, horizontal, social 
contract, emanating from the first, between people in a well-structured society. This often occurs 
through organization in interest groups. With rules of the game clear and enforceable (offered by 
the	   legal system and law enforcement), as well as popular representation (through functioning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The use of taxation in order to obtain a measure of redistributive justice appears to have been successfully 
achieved essentially only in the developed world thus far, through cash transfers and generally in the form of a social 
security system (see Cobham 2005). 
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democratic institutions), the chances of fair play, both vertically between subjects and state, and 
horizontally, between groups and citizens, will increase (Di John 2009:3).  
 
Mick Moore (2007:17) presents a model, which closely relates to the twin issues of state 
capacity/collective action, for how broad taxation can be argued to have immediate and 
intermediate effects on governance, and governance outcomes. Moore proposes a chain of three 
immediate taxation-effects, where (a) the state focuses on taxing its citizens, which (b) makes 
citizens more politically engaged, and thus (c) creates bargaining over revenues, alongside 
compliance in return for some influence over the level of taxes raised, as well as its subsequent 
use on the public expenditure side. Through this process, four types of governance outcomes 
ensue: more (1) responsiveness and (2) accountability, as well as increased (3) bureaucratic and (4) 
political capability.  
 
Although often described in bright colors, the process of bargaining does not have to be 
amicable in order to be beneficial. Hårsmar (201?????????????????????????-?????? as an ?invaluable 
force for increased efficiency in the provision of public services and for better governance in 
?????????? The very fact that taxation has a tendency to aggravate the citizenry can thus be 
perceived in a positive light. In a lecture on taxation systems, Braithwaite (2007) makes an 
important distinction between resistant and dismissive defiance, where the first means that while 
citizens might indeed be dissatisfied with the decisions made by those in power and protest, they 
??? ???? ???????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????Displays of dismissive defiance, on the 
other hand, equal challenging the very foundation of state power and is much more problematic 
from a governance standpoint. Charles Tilly (2009) makes a similar distinction between a healthy 
form of grudging consent, and uncompromising resistance, which is akin to Braithwa?????? ???????????
defiance. Furthermore, Tilly introduces the opposite of uncompromising resistance, passive 
acceptance, which might be just as detrimental. 
 
Theoretically, there thus appears to be reason to expect a positive relationship between taxation 
and QoG. Bräutigam (2008) sums up the general argument as follows:  
 
the political importance of taxation extends beyond the raising of revenue. Taxation can 
stimulate calls for more representative and accountable governments, while the need to 
increase revenues can stimulate institution-building. 
 
In theory, gains from taxation on QoG thus seem abundant. Theory is, nevertheless, only as 
good as its connection to reality. Taxation is a broad instrument, which in real life can take many 
different shapes. Sometimes it is broad-based and other times it is directed at a small segment of 
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society;; its collection can be technically and administratively very complicated, or it can rely on 
draconian and primitive practices. We thus need to take both its quantitative (how much taxation is 
collected?) and qualitative (what kind of taxation is collected? How is it collected?) features under 
consideration. Furthermore, as the tax-QoG theory is based upon the Western historical 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???
give rise to al??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on inherent appeal and plausibility than they do on rigorous specificatio????????????????????????? 	  
The Bigger, the Better? How the Size of Taxation Matters 
The theoretical foundation for the idea of taxation as a prerequisite for state building and 
developing government quality can be traced back to well-cited and empirically often rigorous 
historical research on state formation in early-modern Europe. Already a century ago, Joseph 
Schumpeter (1991 [1919]:100) put the relationship thusly: ?the fiscal history of a people is above 
????????????????????????? ????????????????????? whereas Margaret ???????????????Of Rule and Revenue 
opens with the following, equally grand, statement: ?The history of state revenue production is 
the history of the evolution of the state.?????????????????????????????, as we have seen, twofold: a 
bargaining over revenue extraction, which is considered to have been a significant contribution to 
popular mobilization, accountability and democratization, alongside which a strong state 
bureaucracy is said to have grown out of the need to administrate first the increased demands of 
maintaining a standing army, then a wider range of public services. This process, Mann calls the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????dimorphous 
civil-military state? of the nineteenth (Mann 1993:378), and where regular taxation is identified as 
?????????????????????? ?rise ????????????? Charles Tilly in particular is noted for highlighting the 
role of war in the construction of the modern state, and his ???????????states made war and war 
made states? (Tilly 1993:ch. 3) is commonly used within and outside academia.  
 
One example of the importance of modernized tax collection we find in Ertman (1997), who 
?????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ?????ietary 
officeholding and privatized tax collection, tax-farming, as a key f????????????????????????????????n 
régime France, inexorably towards bankruptcy and revolution over the course of the 18th 
?????????? ???????? ?????158). Levi notes that, in terms of the capacity-focused view, more 
revenue meant that early modern states gained from increased revenue economies of scale 
(1988:1), and were able to extend the reach and scope of power (ibid.:2) 
 
It is not only early modern Europe that has experienced as similar trajectory of  taxation-based 
development. ?????? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ?????? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ????? ??, Costa 
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Rica, South Korea and Taiwan, which all developed a large and broad tax base early on, Samuel 
(2009:24) places taxation as a centr?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Tax is not the sole determinant of rapid development, but it is one pillar of an effective 
state, and may also provide the basis for accountable and responsive systems. 
 
Japan, colonizer of both Korea and Taiwan, is another example of a state using taxation to 
modernize its state, as it managed to switch its feudal system for an extensive and monetized 
system of land taxation during the 19th century (World Bank 2008:13). We thus have some reason 
to believe that the taxation-state capacity argument is able to travel outside of Europe. 
 
If we look at current conditions, Ross (2004), and Mahon (2005), use a cross-country dataset 
covering 113 countries worldwide, going back some thirty years, in order to detect the 
relationship between level of taxation and several governance-related variables. Ross is interested 
in, and refutes?? ???? ??????????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ????????????????? ????? ?????????2. Mahon 
focuses more on characteristics of the liberal state, but reaches the conclusions that increased 
taxation might have effects on good government, at least in the case of direct taxes.  
 
??? ???? ????????????????? ???????????? studies, using either fairly aggregate levels of taxes (in 
Ross 2004, and to a slightly lesser extent, 2001), or just specification regarding direct taxes,3 offer 
a relatively reliable and simple measurement of what Moore and Bräutigam, and their likes, allude 
to in their discussion of governance and taxes. On the other hand, it risks being too simplistic, 
missing important points regarding who gets taxed, as well as how revenue is collected, which 
subsequently carries a strong relationship to how visible taxes are in a given society. Even though 
?????????????????????????????????????????????is better than no money, as without it there would be 
no state4, certain taxes might just be better than others.  
 
Are All Taxes Equal? The Shape of Taxation Argument 
The development literature places heavy emphasis upon developing a broad tax base, which in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????e (DAC) (2008a:3, cf. Moore 2007, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????). For example, Fjeldstad and Moore (2007:15) 
note that in Tanzania, over 70 % of the tax base comes from less than 300 large taxpayers. As 
many developing countries collect a large share of their tax base from the natural resource sector 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 although this diverges somewhat from his findings in 2001(:349), where an aggregation of indirect and direct taxes 
seems to be beneficial for democracy, although only short-term. 
3 Mahon does discuss the merits of both indirect and direct taxes, but unfortunately does not compare them 
statistically as indirect taxes is left out of his quantitative analysis. 
4 case in point: the United Arab Emirates is doing better than Somalia by just about any standard, even though native 
UAE citizens pay virtually no taxes, as oil revenues are in abundance here. 
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(see a longer discussion below), by definition a non-broad-based revenue stream, aggregate tax 
numbers will risk clouding governance-relevant mechanisms (see also appendix I).  
 
The opposite, it can be argued, is the direct tax, especially the personal income taxes that 
aggravates (and engages) so many citizens, which according to the above mentioned theoretical 
framework ought to kick-start a bargaining process. Recently the DAC and others (see Fjeldstad 
and Moore5) have argued for a taxation strategy based on a switch from trade taxes, which are 
??????????? ?????????????as well as run a risk of diminishing exports, to indirect taxes, such as VAT 
(Value Added Tax), which the DAC claims,  
 
has made tax more visible and transparent in a number of countries. This represents an 
important first step towards making the tax relationship a focus for constructive 
bargaining between taxpayers and the state. While VAT is not an ideal instrument, it 
works to some degree like a direct tax applicable to most consumers and may in some 
cases provide a practical way forward in widening the tax base in economies with large 
smallholder and informal sectors. (OECD 2008a:10) 	  
Furthermore, Prichard and Leonard (2010:660) argue that VAT might require a just as 
sophisticated tax administration as income taxes, and that in developing countries, such sales 
taxes are often a more important stream of revenue than direct taxes in developing countries. Di 
John, however, notes that among underdeveloped countries that have replaced trade taxes, those 
who managed to retain their level of tax income managed to do this through both income tax 
and VAT (Di John 2009:12). 
 
Thus, direct and/or indirect taxes might be especially governance-boosting. Not only do they 
raise revenue, just like any type of tax, but furthermore they stand in contrast to trade taxes, as 
the payers of such taxes actually are citizens of the country where the revenue lands which, 
according to the theoretical framework discussed above ought to generate a bargaining process. 
Furthermore, the fact that the collection process of such taxes tends to be more demanding 
ought to spur a need for rationalization of the bureaucracy, and thus a step towards increasing 
state capacity. Both of the mechanisms outlined above thus seem to be in place. 
 
As a point of comparison, ???? ???????-aspect still appears to matter in the developed world. A 
quick glance at the relationship between income taxes levied upon individuals as a share of GDP 
and government effectiveness in the OECD states shows that the correlation is positive and 
strong, stronger compared to total taxes as a percentage of GDP;; clearly a tentative result, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 although the authors note that the reforms at time shave been both hastily and suboptimally carried out 
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one that is in line with the theoretical assumptions employed in this paper. Interestingly, indirect 
taxation (here defined as taxes on goods and services) hold no significant relationship to 
government effectiveness.6 Taxation, at least in the developed world, still seems to have an effect 
on state capacity, three centuries after the era when Tilly and his peers claimed it had such an 
important formative impact. Furthermore, the shape does appear to matter. 
 
Much of the taxation ? governance literature assumes that there really is some sort of  bargaining 
over the payment of taxes, and not just heavy coercion on the part of the tax collecting state. 
While Mahon?????????????????????????????????????????????? (at least in its direct form) inherently 
works as a democratizing force, we must also be open to the idea that in many autocratic states, 
the bargaining process, itself a fairly characteristic trait of democracy, might not be in place. 
Historic and current autocracies have indeed succeeded in forcing its citizenry to relinquish 
considerable assets without much dialogue and deliberation (cf. Rothstein and Broms 2010). 
Thus, the tax ? bargaining process may well be contingent upon at least a modicum of 
democracy to start with (see p. 18 for a more detailed discussion).  
 
As already alluded to, another major caveat to the government revenue ? QoG-theory is the well-
?????? ?????????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ??? ??? ????ed that windfall revenue from, and heavy 
dependence upon, a natural resource will not only inhibit diversification in the marketplace 
(known as the ?Dutch disease?), but it will also stand in the way of developing an efficient 
bureaucracy, which in other case would be a necessary condition in order to fruitfully collect 
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
As it is often considered easier to tax natural resources than citizens, arrangements based upon 
this leading sector thus sets the bar low for the rest of the institutional framework. Furthermore 
it makes ???? ??????????? ???????????????????????? ????????????? ????? ???????????????????? Potentially, 
t?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 
?????? ?? ???? ?????????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ?????????????? ????? ?? ???????? ?????? ??? ????
?????????????????ings. 
 
This could not stand in a starker contrast to the proposed effects of broad based revenue 
collection. Taxation measurements do not always take this under consideration (for example, the 
oft-used World Bank measurements of government revenue do not a?????????????????????????????
of such revenue [see appendix I]), which, at least in theory, should lead to very different results in 
terms of QoG.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????
Effectiveness (World Bank 2002, in Samanni et al. 2010): Income, profits and capital gains tax on individuals: r=,61 
(sig ,000); Total tax revenue: r=,47 (sig ,029), and Taxes on goods and services: r= -,04 (not significant). (tax data: 
OECD 2006 [data from 2002], in Samanni et al. 2010) 
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This is not necessarily a new problem. One historical point of comparison is what happened to 
the Spanish state in the 16th century after establishing itself as a major colonial power. Following 
the discovery of the Americas, Spain quickly became an imperial state with a revenue base relying 
upon rents gathered in the colonies, accompanied by agriculture and sheep herding at home. 
When the former revenue proved an unreliable source of income, the state began to borrow 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
primitive bureaucracy, the state declared bankruptcy six times during a century-long period of 
general stagnation between the middle of the 16th century and the middle of the 17th.  As a 
contrast, England meanwhile was in the process of developing an efficient tax bureaucracy, and 
a, for the time, (proto-)democratic system of governance. (Bräutigam 2002;; North and Weingast 
1989).  
 
A similarly constructed argument has been made in the case ??? ???????? ????? ??? ??????????
???????, foreign aid (Moore 2004:304). Instead of relying on its citizenry, poor countries grow 
accustomed to receiving Official Development Aid (ODA) from wealthy countries and IGOs. 
According to a number of studies, there are potentially harmful effects of aid on governance (cf. 
Bräutigam and Knack 2004;; Rajan and Subramanian 2007;; Busse and Gröning 2009;; to an extent 
Walker and Maxwell 2009, and Economides et al. 2008:464;; for an opposing	  point of view, see 
Tavares 2003). Djankov et al. (2008:170) even contend ????? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ?????
harmful than the oil curse. Studies have also shown that the mere process of receiving aid puts a 
large strain on recipient governments (Moss et al. 2006:8). The same authors note that: 
 
Aid flows themselves, separate from particular inefficiencies of the aid system, can affect 
the evolution of state-society relations. If donors are providing the majority of public 
finance and governments are primarily accountable to those external agencies, then it 
may simply not be possible to also expect a credible social contract to develop between 
the state and its citizens (Moss et al. 2006, p.14) 
 
Hence, we can conclude not only that not all kinds of government revenue appear to be equal in 
terms of the development of institutional quality, but that some might even be directly harmful. 
 
The Case: sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is an interesting testing ground for dissecting the taxation-governance 
relationship. First, the group of states within the region displays great variation, both in levels and 
types of taxation, and government performance. Second, it is an ideal site to look at the possible 
???????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????????? ???????????
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Third, the great majority of these states became decolonized at around the same time (hovering 
around 1960), so their respective journeys as independent nations are roughly the same duration, 
and still very much in transition.  	  
Fourth, and perhaps most interesting, many of the theoretical arguments pertaining to the 
societal role of taxation, as we have seen, are mainly rooted in European, and North American 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generalizability to these ideas. Taxation, some experts claim, in less developed countries should 
not be treated as a different beast from the OECD region (NEPAD-OECD 2009:16, although 
people like Moore (2004) express some doubts), and as we in the West have now learnt much 
from looking back in history and made fruitful comparisons between the institutional setting and 
bargaining over state revenue in an early modern and pre-industrial revolution setting and the 
situation today, why could not the rest of the world be subject to such a process?  
 
The role of (particularly interstate) war is especially interesting. Herbst (1990), who draws on 
much of the above cited historical literature, makes a pessimistic comparison to modern-day 
Africa, on the somewhat counter-intuitive grounds that the Tillyan state-building effects of 
interstate war have been absent here, and while war of course is nothing to aim for, the cold hard 
facts are that consolidation today might be more difficult. This is due to the fact that in Europe, 
weaker states perished or became engulfed by mightier ones, a faith more improbable in the post 
WWII-political reality, where the political boundaries are more fixed, and failing states are more 
prone to ?????????????, through for example loans and aid. While such observations are indeed 
important, they are a bit sweeping: loans were a necessary prerequisite in early-modern Europe 
too, especially for quickly raising armies, and natural resource rents did indeed exist and cause 
ruckus already in the 16th century. Meanwhile, the geopolitical climate and economic 
globalization could be said to be unique for the modern era. Still, at a first glance many of these 
differences seem to be of degree rather than kind, and not enough to deterministically dismiss 
the power of taxation, but rather fruitfully challenge the original ??????????????????? 
 
Rakner and Gloppen (2003) look at tax reform in three SSA states and notice that, while the 
general situation might be different from historic Western Europe, and that it is too early to see 
whether the success there can be replicated elsewhere, some signs do point towards a  possible 
governance dividend: Tax reforms in order to gather more revenue from corporations have 
??????? ??????? ????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????? ????????
through formal, public organizations, rather than through bribery and public deals may indicate 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2003:15). This can be understood in terms of Braithwa?????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ????
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could thus be a sign that the taxation ? governance model can be extended to the 
underdeveloped world.  
 
Finally, while the theoretical outline has been fairly developed, and plenty of case studies in 
modern sub-Saharan Africa have been conducted (see Prichard 2010;; Fjeldstad and Semboja 
2001;; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen;; Di John 2009), quantitative cross-country results are more 
scarce, and the ones that exist are generally dealing with the resource and aid curses (Moore 
2001). Prichard and Leonard 2010) are a welcome exception. Through a fairly rigorous 
quantitative test of the taxation ?  government quality connection in SSA, using time-series cross-
sectional data ranging between 1983 and 2005, they find that prior to the mid-90s there indeed 
was a significant and positive effect of taxation, but that it since has vanished.  
 
Time and Causality 
Albeit I find both the suggested theoretical ideas and empirical findings above to be both 
reasonable in their intellectual underpinnings and well-crafted in their analyses, I believe that the 
issue of causality must be addressed in brief;; as one links together broad societal phenomena, 
wherein we certainly can include taxation and governance, one needs to recognize that the causal 
mechanism is not simply a one-way street;; to deny the possibility that a more efficient 
government will be able to raise more revenue than a broken-down one is not only dubious, it is 
highly unlikely. Even if the titular Somali government wanted to raise as much taxes as Botswana, 
it does not have the ability to do so. Instead, I work under the assumption that this type of 
process is one characterized by feed-back mechanisms and perhaps best can be understood in 
terms of virtuous or vicious circles: phenomenon A leads to phenomenon B, which leads to 
more of A, etc.. In this case, I follow what I found to be the most convincing arguments of the 
theoretical debate, and ??????????A?, the independent variable, to be the taxation factor, affecting 
?B?? ?????????? ?????? as7  	  
Another important question is how fast taxation can be expected to affect the institutional 
setting;; as we have seen above, ???????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????
millennia, back in time ??????????????????????????????????or explaining current conditions (cf. North 
and Weingast 1989;; Putnam 1993;; Ertman 1997). In these cases, the institutional variable is 
generally (although not for Putnam) treated as the explanatory. When it comes to the effects of 
taxation, where institutional quality is treated as dependent, there may be good cause to look into 
more simultaneous conditions too. ????????????????????????????????????????????????? by the taxpayer, 
both when it comes to the assumed negative effects of excessive tariffs or a hike in the personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although it falls outside of the quantitative analysis below, it is not unlikely that one could conceptualize taxation as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
more capable government ought to be able to gather more taxes), but as a cause for higher accountability (as the 
theoretical considerations above point to). 
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income tax, and is thus subject to a constant reevaluation of legitimacy among the citizenry. Ross 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Tax revolts 
are a historically frequent example of such a direct consequence of tax policy (Levi 1988:93). 
Second, equally directly, the revenue stream affects state capacity in the sense that it forms the 
???????????????????????????????? (although the systematic deficit-running seen in many states of 
today might out	   this into question). In their quantitative analysis of tax-QoG, Prichard and 
Leonard (2010) find that a lag of five years rendered the highest level of significance. 
 
 
 
Oversight of Data and Methods 
In a cross-country analysis, with uni-, bi- and multivariate elements, the following analysis will 
attempt to test the relationship between, on the one hand, the size and shape of taxation, and 
governance variables on the other. Indeed, to really get to the bottom of these questions, a 
quantitative cross-country analysis might not be the ideal instrument, ??????????? ???? ???????????
look employed here, but using a bit more specified data over different types of taxation, we can 
at least approximate a bit closer to the issue, and complement both the burgeoning body of case-
study research, and the more wide-ranging quantitative studies.  
 
Quality of Government Measured 
The delicate matter of measurement is one that habitually haunts the social scientist, and 
governance research is in no way an exception. Over the last few decades, the development and 
research community has developed a number of indexes of QoG-related issues. Amongst the 
most used measurements we find ????????????? ???????????????? ??????????? ??????????? ????? 
(CPI)???????????????????????measure of Government Effectiveness (GE). Although nominally 
and theoretically measuring different things, they tend to correlate very strongly;; the correlation 
between the two is at ,90 globally (and ,77 in SSA). A third governance measurement, specific to 
???????? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (IAG), which exhibits a 
similarly strong relationship (,71 and ,83) with the two other indexes. The fact that they are so 
closely related encourages us, to the extent one can ensure such things, that the indexes do tap 
into what we want to measure, and the slight differences they do have will provide a good 
robustness test. Below, we see the top and bottom performers on these measurements: 	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TABLE 1. QOG IN SSA ? HIGH AND LOW PERFORMERS 
Top Five Bottom Five 
CPI GE IAG CPI GE IAG 
BOT 6,4 RSA ,71 MAS 81.1 NIG 1.6 DRC -1.9 SOM 20.9 
NAM 5,7 BOT ,68 SEY 77.8 ANG 1.7 LIB -1.6 DRC 28.2 
CAV 4,9 MAS ,39 CAV 74.8 CHA 1.7 SOM -1.6 SUD 35.1 
RSA 4,8 NAM .10 BOT 72.4 MAD 1.7 CAR -1.6 BUR 36.7 
MAS 4,5 SEN .03 NAM 70.7 EQG 1.9 BUR -1.6 ANG 37.1 
Note: CPI Ranges 0-10;; GE -2,5-2,5, IAG 0-100. For a list of the countries in the study, and their corresponding 
abbreviation, see appendix II 
  
Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and Cap Verde are among the top performers in all three 
measures, and South Africa appears twice. In the bottom bracket, there is less uniformity, yet 
Angola, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi all appear twice. 
 
Taxation Measured 
Moore (2004:16, see also Prichard and Leonard 2010) laments the troubles in statistically 
analyzing the taxation?governance connection, partly because of a general dearth of reliable and 
valid taxation data, especially for governments dependent upon aid and natural resource rents. 
Available taxation indexes and measurements all carry weaknesses. One, utmost pragmatic, 
solution is to employ different measures, not unlike the tactic we employ when capturing QoG. 
Furthermore, the very nature of the research problem at hand demands we look at different 
kinds of taxation. Therefore, this paper will use several different measurements of taxation, 
including checks for revenue from natural resource (although this is not the focus of the paper), 
to make sure that we measure what we want to measure. This should, naturally, not be seen as a 
guarantee for obtaining the perfect data, but a modest and initial ??????? ???? ????? ????? ????
problem. The fact that our sample of countries is limited (SSA equals an N of 48 cases, of which 
a few fall out in the final analysis due to data gaps;; see appendix II), the goal for the subsequent 
statistical analysis will be to keep things clear and simple. 
 
For the question of the size-question, relating to the aggregate level of taxation, we use a 
measurement of tax revenue as % of GDP8, the variable Total Tax (n=45). The second, shape-
related, question demands we go deeper and look into the composition of the tax base;; as the 
theoretical basis suggests that a larger share in direct and indirect taxation will lead to higher QoG, 
we use another OECD measurement where these types of taxation are presented separately. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Derived from OECD:s African Economic Outlook (2010, data from 2007;  www.africaneconomicoutlook.com, 
country profiles, Macroeconomic Policy) 
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These variables, which will henceforth be called Direct Tax and Indirect Tax (n=36), are measured 
as a percentage of the total tax base. 	  
In order to complement these quite straight-forward variables of tax extraction, we use a third 
type of measurement from the AEO: tax effort. This type of measurement is by many experts 
(Pritchard and Leonard 2010;; Bird et al. 2004) considered a superior way of getting to how much 
tax revenue a state raises, compared to how much can be expected.9 Interestingly, the AEO has 
one measure where natural resource-revenue is included (Tax-Effort [n=38]), and another where it 
is left out (Resource-Free Tax-Effort [n=38]). The former is ??????????????????????????????-variable, 
while the latter has a slight ???????????????????t, at least by means of taking out natural resource 
dependence.  	  
In order to further relate to ????????????????????? we also measure the ratio between Tax-Effort 
and Resource-Free Tax-Effort, which thus measures the relative effort in collecting resource-based 
versus resource-free taxes, the Tax Effort Resource-Rent Index, (TERRI) (n=38). While it does not 
explicitly deal with direct or indirect taxation, it relates to the weight which states place 
? ????????? ??? ??????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? If the measure for a state equals 1, 
natural resources makes no impact on how well taxes are collected;; anything under 1 means that 
non-natural resource taxes are less extensively collected than resource taxes, while any value over 
1 indicates that non-natural resource taxes are collected to a greater extent than resource-related 
revenue. This index, as with the measures of direct and indirect tax, leaves absolute 
measurements of taxation, and captures the composition of the tax base??????????????.  
 
Finally, we include a variable where Total-, Direct- and Indirect Tax all are taken into account, 
Direct+Indirect Tax/GDP ???????????????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ???? ???????-related 
variables Direct Tax, Indirect Tax and TERRI all are plagued with quite significant data gaps. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Direct- and Indirect tax together make up more than 10 % of total GDP (yes: n=18, no: n=30), 
and is thus constructed as a dummy variable.  
  
  
  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In practical terms, the variable is calculated as tax as a percentage of GDP, under control for relevant structural 
variables such as share of population working in agriculture, and openness to trade (ratio trade:GDP). The tax effort 
calculation can use slight variations of control variables, but the end result tends to be very similar. 
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TABLE 2. TAXATION MEASURES IN SSA ? HIGH AND LOW PERFORMERS 	  
	  
Botswana ranks consistently high (thrice, although it appears in the bottom-five on tax-effort), 
and two-timers include South Africa, Uganda, as well as Senegal. In the bottom, there is more 
homogeneity;; Equatorial Guinea ranks at the very bottom on all accounts save for tax-effort, and 
also Angola and Congo appear on the list across the board (except for, again, tax-effort, where 
they are both top five). Chad and Nigeria ranks bottom-five in three out of six instances. As will 
be shown more clearly below (table 3), the tax variables, except for Tax Effort, generally do 
demonstrate a good measure of internal consistency. 
 
Prior to presenting these findings we will take a brief look into an issue that fall outside the scope 
of the central inquiry, but nevertheless contain findings pertinent to the larger issue of taxation 
and governance.  
 
Bargaining? 
Following Mahon (2005, though see also Tilly 2007 who contends that all revenue extraction 
originating from the citizenry entails some measure of bargaining), we look at the proposal that 
the beneficial state-society effects from taxation is conditional upon the fact that the fiscal social 
contract really is a bargaining process between the government and its citizens, rather than just an 
increased measure of coercion. An, admittedly crude (and admittedly subject to issues of 
endogeneity) measure of the level of bargaining/coercion present with??? ?? ?????????? ???????
contract is quite simply to see whether there is a minimum of democracy to start with. Rakner 
and Gloppen (2003:17) offer an account of how tax evasion, through semi-military operations 
carried out by military personnel, quite literally is being combated in (non-democratic) Uganda, 
????? ???? ??????? ????? ????? ????? ????????????? ??? ????????? ?? ???-culture based on quasi-voluntary 
compliance is undermined by the short term goal of meeting tax demands set by the international 
???????? ???????????????By dividing the cases in our study into two subsets, one with a Freedom 
House score below 5 (n=19, on a ten-point scale, where ten is most democratic), and another 
above it (n=25), we note that the correlation between taxation as a percentage of GDP and QoG 
Total tax Direct tax Indirect Tax TERRI Tax-Effort Resource-
Free Tax-
Effort 
Total tax Direct tax Indirect tax TERRI Tax-Effort Resource-
Free Tax-
Effort 
LES 57.9 RSA 55.1 MAS 66.7 RSA 1.56 LES 2.1 LES 2.7 EQG 1.4 EQG 2.1 EQG 1.7 EQG .07 MAD .64 EQG .08 
SWA 37.7 ZAM 46.4 UGA 59.8 BOT 1.51 ANG 2.0 SWA 2.2 NIG 5.4 SUD 5.3 ANG 4.5 ANG .19 GUI .67 CHA .28 
SAP 36.4 BOT 43.4 SEN 55.4 NAM 1.39 LIB 1.9 LIB 1.7 CHA 5.6 CON 5.8 CHA 5.1 CON .23 MAS .69 ANG .39 
BOT 33.5 MAL 41.6 BUF 55.1 SEN 1.39 CON 1.8 COM 1.6 CON 6.0 ANG 5.9 NIG 5.2 NIG .25 MAU .73 CON .42 
LIB 27.7 KEN 41.6 RWA 50.9 UGA 1.37 NIG 1.8 NAM 1.6 ANG 6.4 GAB 9.9 CON 8.1 CHA .30 BOT .80 NIG .44 
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is positive and significant only in the latter group (r= GE .65, CPI .68, IAG .72, all significant at 
99 % level).  	  
FIGURE 1. TAX AND QOG IN DEMOCRACIES AND AUTOCRACIES 
 
 
Note: ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? 
With a 57.9 % tax intake, and mediocre CPI score, Lesotho (democratic) is here treated as an outlier 
 
Although this is a very small sample, and the test not subject to any further controls, we can at 
least conclude that, at face value, the argument carries some merit, and maybe this can be related 
???????????????:116) analysis of tax extraction in early-modern England and France, where  
 
the early modern parliament enabled the English monarch to negotiate taxes that were 
acceptable to key constituents who then helped enforce them. The less constrained 
French monarchs could impose more taxes in principle but with less certainty and higher 
costs of collection. 
 
At the very least, characteristics such as state-society cooperation and certainty in implementing 
government decisions, are components closely related to the concept of QoG.   
 
 
Analysis 
The next step is to take the ????????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? government quality to test by 
controlling for rival explanations, established as relevant in the existing body of research, through 
a multivariate regression analysis. The variables used here are: 
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GDP/Capita (GDP). Among the strongest predictors of government quality is 
level of development and wealth;; richer countries are generally less corrupt, and more 
efficient (La Porta et al. 1998). While the causality certainly is debatable, as persuasive 
arguments backed by empirical findings have been made that quality of government 
itself generates wealth (cf. Keefer and Knack 1997), the variable is included due to a) an 
assumption that this kind of causal relationship generally is circular and, to an extent 
can be seen to go both ways;; and b) a desire to challenge our tax-related variable as 
much as possible. The measurement is derived from Gleditsch (2002, in Sammani et al. 
2010) and measures logged real GDP/Capita. 
Ethnic Fractionalization (EF). This variable too, is an oft-cited indicator of 
government quality (Alesina et al. 2003). A culturally and socially unified country is 
expected to be easier to govern, and less corruptible. A number of different 
measurements exist to capture this, and several of them use ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. SSA in particular has been plagued by ethnic strife and civil war. In 
order to maximize the sample si???? ???? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ???????
Fractionalization, a similar measure which was chosen due to its broad data coverage.10 
Population Size (PS). Similar in many ways to the ethnic fractionalization-
argument above, it is noted that smaller countries generally tend to be easier to govern, 
with smaller regional differences.  
Aid Dependency (AD). ????? ??????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ??????????
??????? ? ??????nt, i.e. a state which generates a considerable portion of its wealth in 
form of windfall revenue lacks the incentives to develop an efficient bureaucracy, and 
the leadership grows less dependent upon its citizenry. This is measured as Direct 
foreign aid as % of GDP.  
Colonial Origin (CO). Djankov et al. (2003) have shown that legal origin is a 
potent explanatory factor for current administrative behavior. Furthermore, this 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????might be thought to 
have a similar, if not broader, effect on modern-day administration. The variable is a 
dummy variable indicating British colonial rule, and accompanying legal origin.  
Early Threats (ET). Persson and Sjöstedt (2010) have constructed a dummy 
variable indicating whether the political leadership, during the fifteen first years of 
independence, was subject to threats. This variable has been shown to carry a 
significant, negative, effect on quality of government in SSA. Furthermore, historical 
threats could in theory work both ways in terms of tax collection. As seen above, 
threats caused by interstate conflict is what generated the demand tax state in early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
fractionalization 1985, the value for Sao Tome and Principe is imputed from Yeoh 2001. 
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modern Europe;; still, the African context has been more dominated by internal 
conflicts, and could thus yield very different results.11  
 
Within these control variables, it might be useful to conceptually distinguish between historic, 
structural, and current factors. Within the first category, pertaining to historic factors, we find Early 
Threats and Colonial Origin. Such variables concerning the institutional, administrative, and legal 
setting, along with the foundational circumstances of a state is, as we have seen above, just the	  
type of things that are likely to affect both revenue collecting and quality of government in 
general. Including such variables will not only test the tax ? QoG hypothesis, it can also tell us if 
such historic variables have a direct causal effect on QoG, or if taxation might be seen as an 
intermediary variable.  
 
The same principle ought to apply for the structural variables, population size and ethnic 
fractionalization, which are the kind of rival explanations that very unlikely could be considered to 
be affected by either our taxation measures and the other rival explanations, but might, according 
to literature have an effect on these, and certainly the taxation measure. Finally the current 
control variables, such as GDP and Aid Dependency could both influence and be influenced by 
taxation, which would make any high correlations a problematic issue, subject to further 
discussion. 	  
Next, we look at the bivariate correlations between the included variables. In table 3 below, we 
notice that, apart form Tax Effort, which is both positively and negatively correlated to other tax 
variables, there is a rather high internal positive correlation between the tax related variables, yet 
only in three instances (TERRI - Direct Tax and Resource-Free Tax Effort, and Resource-Free Tax 
Effort ? Total Tax) the correlation exceeds (P????????? ??? ???? At the other end of the spectrum 
Indirect Tax holds no significant relation to Total Tax.12  
 
The tax measures generally correlate with the QoG indicators, ??????????????????????-variables, but 
also with some of the control variables, especially the historic variables Early Threats and to a 
lesser extent Colonial Origin. Among the other control variables, GDP and Ethnic Fractionalization 
tend to correlate with the governance indicators, respectively positive and negative.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Liberia is coded as 1, due to internal conflict both following the foundation of the Republic in 1847, and during the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
12 In a Principal Component Analysis (Varimax rotation) conducted on the six taxation variables, the results are 
essentially in line with the theoretical assumptions. The variation is not large, but with an eigenvalue threshold of 1, 
??????????????????????????????????????????-component with Total Tax and Resource-Free Tax-Effort, and one 
????????????????????????Direct Tax, Indirect Tax, and (negatively) Tax-Effort. TERRI scored similarly on both 
components, but slightly stronger on the second. 
TABLE 3, CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
 
TERRI 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax-Effort 
 
 
 
 
Res.-Free 
Tax-Effort Total Tax Direct Tax 
Indirect 
Tax 
Dir. + 
Indir. Tax CPI GE IAG 
Early 
Threats 
Colonial 
Origin 
GDP/ 
Capita 
Ethnic 
Fract. Aid Pop. 
TERRI 1                             
Tax-Effort -,39* 1               
Resource-Free Tax-Effort ,71** ,31 1              
Total Tax .57** ,32 ,85** 1                         
Direct Tax  .78** -,30 ,54** .37* 1                       
Indirect Tax .64** -,51** ,23 .03 .51** 1                     
Direct + Indirect Tax  .61** ,05 ,62** .50** .61** .51** 1                   
CPI .56** -,16 ,41* .49** .48** .20 .49** 1                 
GE .57** -,25 ,36* .48** .43** .35* .56** .77** 1               
IAG .59** -,28 ,34* .41** .47** .43** .43** .72** .83** 1             
Early Threats -.47** ,02 -,44** -.54** -.54** -.10 -.45** -.51** -.47** -.50** 1           
Colonial Origin .25 ,29 ,47** .39** .40* -.13 .38** .14 .14 .04 -.35* 1         
GDP/Capita .06 -,02 ,04 .28 -.06 -.10 .25 .59** .60** .56** -.30* .01 1       
Ethnic Fractionalization -.23 -,19 -,44** -.48** -.00 .02 -.14 -.34* -.26 -.30* .18 .07 -.45** 1     
Aid .11 ,03 ,14 -.03 .25 .19 .03 -.29* -.47** -.36* .21 .04 -.58** .11 1   
Population -.21 ,12 -,17 -.27 -.04 -.13 -.10 -.19 -.10 -.21 .11 .23 -.24 .34* .03 1 
N 38 38 38 45 36 36 45 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 48 
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The hypotheses are further tested in a set of three multivariate analyses, one for each dependent 
variable (DV), CPI, GE, and IAG. In a total of ten ??????????? ?????? ????? ???????????????????????
combined explanatory power in a baseline model (Model 1), followed by a test of each of the 
seven taxation variables in turn (size: Model 2, 3 and 4;; shape: 5 through 7), and finally three 
models (Model 8, 9 and 10?????????????????????????????????????????size and shape. 
 
Results  
The results are slightly different depending on the DV used, but some general conclusions can be 
drawn: First, at between 45 and 50 % explained variation, the explanatory power of the baseline 
model is fairly strong. Second, as Model 1 shows, GDP and Early Threats are the strongest 
explanatory variables before taxes are taken into account. With the tax variables included, GDP 
consistently retains its significance, while Early Threats looses it on many accounts. The models 
with taxation taken into account all have fairly high r2-values (with an explanatory power of 
between 50 and 70 %), yet in general no dramatic increase compared to the baseline model. This 
can, especially with Direct Tax and TERRI, be explained by the loss in Early Threats?? explanatory 
power, and in the following research it is clear that such a factor is highly relevant and must be 
taken into account when discussing the taxation ? governance relationship, as the conditions 
under which SSA states formed still seems to matter greatly for how revenue raising is carried 
out.   
 
??? ????????? ???????????????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? are 
included (in model 2, 3 and 4). Total tax is significant only on GE (but fails in two robustness 
tests, jackknife and bootstrap), although its correlation is positive in all three regressions. As 
opposed to the findings in the bivariate correlation matrix this casts doubt upon ???????????????-
argument. Tax Effort is significantly and robustly negative on IAG and GE (and insignificantly 
negative on CPI), confirming the findings in the bivariate analysis, that natural resource 
dependence, in accordance with the resource curse literature, is indeed negative for QoG. It 
further goes to show how treacherous taxation data might be when it comes to concerns of 
validity, that such a hailed taxation measure show results so different, compared to the other tax 
data. 
 
??????????? models, 5 through 7, show that Direct Tax and TERRI remain positive and significant 
in all three regressions. While Indirect Tax has no significant effect on CPI, its Beta value is 
actually stronger than for Direct Tax when tested on the IAG, and roughly matches it on GE. 
Hence, it might be preconceived to write off the beneficial effects of the VAT and other such 
taxation, although it may be an indication that the findings from the OECD states, where direct 
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taxes had a much stronger relationship to governance than indirect taxes, apply in SSA as well, 
and it might further suggest that there is a diminishing governance dividend of indirect taxation, 
up to a certain level of development. In sum, though, t??? ???????? ??????????? ??? ?????????????
strengthened. 
 
Finally we look at the combined effects of size and shape, first through the  combined measure 
of Direct and Indirect tax> 10 % of GDP (model 8), and	   subsequently Total Tax combined with 
Direct Tax and Indirect Tax, respectively (model 9 and 10). Direct and Indirect tax> 10 % of GDP is 
significant on DVs CPI and GE, but not IAG. Regarding the combined size/shape-models the 
results differ quite a bit depending on the DV, but Direct Tax retains its significance on all 
accounts, while the results for Total-, and Indirect Tax are somewhat weakened. Under control for 
Direct- and Indirect Tax, Total Tax remains significant only when testing on GE (and robust only 
together with Indirect Tax, to a 90 % level of significance only when bootstrapping, but not using 
the jackknife method). Indirect Tax holds its explanatory power in two regressions, GE and IAG, 
but not CPI. With these combined models the R2-values are also not greatly increased compared 
to when measuring the strongest tax-variables separately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION: DEPENDENT CPI 
Note: The values in the cells indicate Beta-values. * sig. >90 %;; ** sig.> 95 %;; *** sig.> 99 % 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AD ,08 ,06 ,17 ,11 -,02 ,10 ,03 ,02 -,02 ,09 
GDP ,50*** ,51*** ,48** ,60*** ,45** ,48** ,55*** ,45** ,50** ,53** 
EF -,10 -,01 -,20 ,06 -,16 -,15 -,01 -,08 -,02 ,01 
CO -,06 -,01 ,12 -,08 -,05 ,09 -,01 -,04 -,15 -,02 
PS -,02 ,03 ,04 ,04 ,02 ,03 ,06 ,02 ,06 ,08 
ET -,30** -,20 -,31** -,24 -,10 -,30* -,10 -,23* -,03 -,20 
Total Tax  ,25       ,27 ,31 
Total Tax-Effort   -,20        
RF Tax-Effort    ,35*       
Direct Tax     ,48***    ,46***  
Indirect Tax      ,22    ,21 
TERRI       ,48***    
D/ITax >10% 
GDP 
       ,29**   
N 47 45 38 38 36 36 38 45 36 36 
R2 ,45 ,49 ,51 ,52 ,60 ,50 ,61 ,52 ,63 ,54 
Adj R2 ,37 ,40 ,39 ,41 ,50 ,38 ,52 ,43 ,52 ,41 
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TABLE 5, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION, DEPENDENT GE 
Note: The values in the cells indicate Beta-values. * sig. >90 %;; ** sig.> 95 %;; *** sig.> 99 % 
 
 
TABLE 6, MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION, DEPENDENT IAG 
Note: The values in the cells indicate Beta-values. * sig. >90 %;; ** sig.> 95 %;; *** sig.> 99 % 	  
 
 
While these res????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
reality, as seen in tables 1 and 2, is a bit more complicated. There is good reason to remember 
that the taxation variables indeed do have a rather high internal correlation, and while statistical 
multicollinearity in models 9 and 10, did not seem to be an issue for the validity of the regression 
results, SSA states that raise the most taxes generally tend to do this through either direct or 
indirect taxes. Rather, what the results tell us is that aggregate taxation measures are in no way 
enough as an appropriate measurement, and that the relative importance of direct, and to an 
extent indirect, taxation for a state indeed matter in their own right. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to detect whether taxation still matters for how well a state is run, 
but has also been driven by the belief that we need to conceptually distinguish between the size 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AD -,17 -,20 -,10 -,16 -,27 -,21 -,24* -,26* -,27 -,22 
GDP ,40** ,41** ,38** ,52** ,36* ,39** ,48*** ,31** ,42** ,46** 
EF -,03 ,08 -,15 ,17 -,11 -,09 -,11 -,01 ,09 ,12 
CO ,07 -,01 ,18 -,07 -,02 ,17 ,04 -,08 -,15 ,02 
PS ,02 ,08 ,06 ,06 ,04 ,06 ,09 ,07 ,09 ,12 
ET -,32** -,19 -,27* -,20 -,09 -,23* -,02 -,21* ,02 -,11 
Total Tax  ,32**       ,37* ,40** 
Total Tax-
Effort 
  -,30**        
RF Tax-Effort     ,41**       
Direct Tax     ,48***    ,45***  
Indirect Tax      ,43***    ,43*** 
TERRI       ,61***    
D/ITax >10% 
GDP 
       ,45***   
N 47 45 38 38 36 36 38 45 36 36 
R2 ,49 ,56 ,55 ,55 ,60 ,63 ,71 ,64 ,66 ,70 
Adj R2 ,42 ,47 ,45 ,44 ,50 ,54 ,65 ,57 ,55 ,61 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AD -,03 -,06 ,09 ,06 -,05 -,03 -,02 -,09 -,05 -,03 
GDP ,43** ,41** ,41** ,52** ,46** ,49*** ,50*** ,36** ,47** ,51*** 
EF ,01 ,05 -,09 ,14 ,03 ,05 ,13 ,02 ,06 ,09 
CO ,02 -,01 ,15 -,04 -,01 ,17 ,02 -,05 -,03 ,14 
PS -,11 -,10 -,07 -,08 -,08 -,06 -,05 -,10 -,07 -,04 
ET -,37*** -,31** -,36** -,34** -,21 -,31** -,16 -,31** -,19 -,28** 
Total Tax  ,14       ,06 ,09 
Total Tax-Effort   -,29**        
RF Tax-Effort    ,25       
Direct Tax     ,40**    ,40**  
Indirect Tax      ,47***    ,47*** 
TERRI       ,49***    
D/ITax >10% 
GDP 
       ,22   
N 47 45 38 38 36 36 38 45 36 36 
R2 ,47 ,48 ,55 ,51 ,58 ,68 ,63 ,50 ,58 ,68 
Adj R2 ,39 ,38 ,45 ,39 ,47 ,60 ,55 ,40 ,46 ,59 
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and shape of taxation in order to get a fuller picture of how it might matter for government 
quality. Such a division, at least at any systemic level, has largely been lacking in the research field. 
Empirically, the results presented above do show that differences in taxation seem to matter for 
the level of government quality and that the size/shape division might well be fruitful: states that 
collect more direct and to an extent indirect taxes also have a higher quality of government, and 
the size of revenue is often less important than what type of tax a state collects.  
 
This is at least partially new information. Following some researchers and organizations, one 
would possibly expect the effects in SSA to be stronger regarding the VAT, as direct taxation 
often have been considered a too technically demanding instrument for the states in the region, 
but the results in this study show that, while both tax types matter positively, direct taxation is a 
better predictor of government quality than indirect taxes. Still, compared to the Western world, 
where indirect taxation does not seem to matter at all, continued reforms from trade taxes to 
VAT appears prudent, but perhaps more as a complement to direct taxes.  
 
The questions posed in the introduction of this paper, regarding who gets taxed how much, and how 
this is done cannot however be claimed to have been answered fully, and needs to be researched 
further. While we have been able to look into the questions of how much, and to an extent how, 
taxes are raised, the who-question remains relatively unclear, although reliance on direct and 
indirect taxes at the very least implies a broader tax collection than resource- and trade taxes. 
Cross-country measures t????? ??? ????? ????????? ????????? does not exist, such as some type of 
measure of which part of the population (along economic, and possibly ethnic/regional lines) 
gets taxed, as well as the level of coercion involved in the collection process,0 would be more 
than welcome in the future.  
 
Still, judging from the results presented in this paper, it seems as we can indeed fruitfully 
compare modern-day developing countries to the Western historical experience in terms of state-
building, if not nearly enough to assume that the trajectory of the latter simply can be emulated. 
In a time when sub-????????????????????????ly??low level of development, generally portrayed in 
terms of poverty and misery, are starting to be questioned (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2010), 
this is encouraging in itself. The figure below, which shows how the relationship between QoG 
(here measured as GE) and direct taxation is very similar in both the OECD and SSA, might 
illustrate the situation more intuitively: 	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FIGURE 2. DIRECT TAX AND QOG IN SSA AND OECD  
 
Note: ??????????????????????????????????????The Direct Tax measure for SSA is the same OECD measurement as the one 
used above;; for OECD it is derived from OECD Revenue Statistics (2006, in Samanni et al 2010).  
	  
One practical implication of these findings, which official organizations such as the OECD itself 
argues for (2008a, 2008b), is to switch ODA means to taxation-related tasks, as well as 
government administration, economic policy and public financial management, posts that today 
only make up a small fraction the total amount, less than a tenth of a percent of current ODA 
(OECD 2008b:3). We must, however not forget that taxation is but one aspect of the fiscal state, 
and the effects of aspects such as debt and national savings, need also be included for a fuller 
picture. To this comes, obviously, the just as crucial aspect of state expenditure, namely how the 
state spends the money it has raised. 
 
As witnessed in the theoretical as in the empirical section, there is much that speaks for the 
taxation ? QoG idea. Still, we could see an even closer relationship, almost inherent in the 
definitions of the concepts. Moore (2008:35) describes an ideal type version of what taxation is:  
 
taxes are involuntary levies on all citizens. All taxation involves the actual or threatened 
exercise of state power: individual taxpayers are obliged to hand over money, with no 
firm guarantee of reciprocity, in situations where they are perceived to have little or no 
choice.  
 
Seen in this way, taxation is almost by definition the opposite of bribes, a paradigmatic example 
of bad governance: a practice wherein, on the individual level, the agent, formally on a voluntary 
basis and apart from the official state guidelines (i.e. laws), pays someone in exchange for a 
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promise of reciprocity. From a collective viewpoint, however, a society with institutionalized and 
endemic bribery and corruption offers little choice for individuals wanting to break free of this 
vicious circle (and break free they do want, cf. Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010), and the quid 
pro quo game of bribes for public goods eventually leaves most players losing. As no democracy 
has yet decided to abolish taxes, on the collective level we can actually talk of voluntariness as an 
aspect of taxation, and the reciprocity, as shown in North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), can also 
in the longer term be expected, as the (fiscally) largest states are also the richest and most 
developed, and thus better able to take care of its citizens. Africa, as most of the developing 
world currently has a shortage of this official reciprocity, or social contract, but making an effort 
in raising the right kind of taxes would be a big step in the right direction.  	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